Hardened Hitachi ID Password Manager server platform
Hitachi ID Password Manager is a security application. It can and should be installed on the most secure server platform possible.
Some of the most effective security measures are common sense:
- Use a single-purpose server for Password Manager. Sharing this server with other applications introduces more complexity and more administrators, each of which carries its own incremental risk.
- Use strong passwords for every administrative account on the server.
- Maintain a current, well-patched operating system on the Password Manager server. This eliminates well-known bugs that have already been addressed by the vendor (Microsoft).
- Keep the Password Manager server in a physically secure location.
- Do not leave a login session open and unattended on the Password Manager server's console.
- Place the Password Manager server on your internal network, rather than on the Internet, if this is at all possible in your environment.
- To make Password Manager available to the Extranet, use a reverse web proxy.
The first step in configuring a secure Password Manager server is to harden its operating system.
Hitachi ID Systems suggests that Password Manager be installed on the Windows 2000/2003 server operating system. The following are suggestions on how to lock down this operating system.
Since the Password Manager server contains (encrypted) sensitive information, it makes sense to limit the number of users who can access its files.
One way to limit the number of users who can access the Password Manager server is to remove it from any Windows NT or Active Directory domains. Since the Password Manager server will not be a member of any domain, this reduces the risk of a security intrusion in the domain being leveraged to gain unauthorized access to the Password Manager server.
The Password Manager setup program creates one local user on the Password Manager server, called psadmin.
The account is, by default, a member of the Administrators group. It is the only account needed by Password Manager. We recommend removing unused accounts, leaving just:
- psadmin - The Password Manager service account.
- One account to be used by the Password Manager administrator to manage the
Note: use the DENY NETWORK LOGON feature in the local
security policy to protect the Administrator account from remote
access attempts using brute force password attacks.
If you must have other accounts on the Password Manager server, then:
- Remove all guest account access to resources.
- Do not increase the default level of access for the Everyone group.
- Do not assign files/directories to the Everyone group.
- Limit the number of administrator-level accounts needed to manage the system.
- Remove the terminal services user account TsInternetUser if it is not needed.
An important way to secure a server on any platform is to reduce the amount of software that it runs. This eliminates potential sources of software bugs that could be exploited to violate the server's security.
Only the following services are required on Password Manager servers:
|DNS Client||Required to resolve host names|
|Event Log||Core O.S. component|
|IIS Admin Service||Only required if IIS is used|
|IPSEC Policy Agent||Core O.S. component|
|Logical Disk Manager||Core O.S. component|
|Network Connections||Required to manage network interfaces|
|Plug and Play||Hardware support|
|Protected Storage||Core O.S. component|
|Remote Procedure Call (RPC)||Core O.S. component|
|Removable Storage||Required to open CD-ROM drives|
|RunAs Service||Core O.S. security component|
|Security Accounts Manager||Core O.S. security component|
|TCP/IP NetBIOS Helper Service||Only required if directly managing WinNT, Win2000 or Win2003 passwords|
|Workstation||Only required if directly managing WinNT, Win2000 or Win2003 passwords|
|World Wide Web Publishing Service||Only required if IIS is used|
All other services should be disabled unless there is some specific reason (not related to Password Manager) to enable them.
Network and session security
The Password Manager server can also take advantage of simple packet filtering services in Windows 2000/2003. These are used to block all inbound connections other than those to the web service, as shown in the figure below:
Open ports are an exploitable means of system entry. By limiting the number of open ports, you effectively reduce the number of potential entry points into the server. Typically only port 443 needs to be open before Password Manager is installed.
The process table on the same server looks like this:
Note: VMWare entries reflect the fact that this sample was taken from a VMWare virtual PC.
This server was running with just the mandatory services described earlier.
Harden the IP stack
Enable the following TCP/IP registry settings as shown below to make the Password Manager server resistant to denial of service (DOS) attacks:
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \Tcpip\Parameters\SynAttackProtectType: REG_DWORD
Value: 1 - reduced re-transmission retries and delayed RCE (route cache entry) creation of the TcpMaxHalfOpen and TcpMaxOpenRetried settings are satisfied (see below).
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \Tcpip\Parameters\TcpMaxHalfOpenType: REG_DWORD
Value: 100 - for Windows 2000 Professional or Server Value: 500 - for Windows 2000 Advanced Server
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \Tcpip\Parameters\TcpMaxHalfOpenRetriedType: REG_DWORD
Value: 80 - for Windows 2000 Professional or Server Value: 400 - for Windows 2000 Advanced Server
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \Tcpip\Parameters\TcpMaxPortsExhaustedType: REG_DWORD
The following keys, not present on a default Windows server installation, are also helpful to protect against a variety of attacks against the IP stack:
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \AFD\Parameters\EnableDynamicBacklogType: REG_DWORD
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \AFD\Parameters\MinimumDynamicBacklogType: REG_DWORD
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \AFD\Parameters\MaximumDynamicBacklogType: REG_DWORD
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \AFD\Parameters\DynamicBacklogGrowthDeltaType: REG_DWORD
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \Tcpip\Parameters\EnableDeadGWDetectType: REG_DWORD
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \Tcpip\Parameters\KeepAliveTimeType: REG_DWORD
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \Tcpip\Parameters\PerformRouterDiscoveryType: REG_DWORD
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \Tcpip\Parameters\EnableICMPRedirectsType: REG_DWORD
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services \Tcpip\Parameters\DisableIPSourceRoutingType: REG_DWORD
The web server is a required component since it provides all user interface modules. It should therefore be carefully protected.
Since Password Manager does not require any web server functionality beyond the ability to serve static documents (HTML, images) and to execute self-contained CGI executable programs, all non-essential web server content should be removed.
Several web servers are commonly available for Windows servers, including Apache, IIS, Sun ONE and more. Most Hitachi ID Systems customers use Apache or IIS.
The Apache server is recommended, as it is well supported and has had a very good security track record.
If you select Apache, you can harden it by:
- Denying access from all clients except those coming from the internal domain. Do this by using the Allow, Deny directives for the Password Manager virtual directories.
- Ensuring that you use only Apache modules that are needed by Password Manager. For example, you do not need modules for PERL, PHP or any other scripting languages. Read through the Apache configuration file and disable LoadModule directives by deleting or commenting them out in httpd.conf.
- Moving the DocumentRoot to a different drive than your system disk (e.g., if your WINNT directory is on C:, then move DocumentRoot to D:).
IIS (Internet Information Server)
IIS is more than a web server - it is also an FTP server, indexing server, proxy for database applications and a server for active content / applications.
If you run Password Manager on IIS, you should disable most of these features, as a bug in any of them would represent a security risk.
Lock down IIS as follows:
Use separate NTFS partitions
Create two separate NTFS partitions - one for the operating system and one for IIS. This will separate most of the operating system files from the application files, allowing a more controlled distribution of permission sets.
Remove non-essential web server content
As stated previously, Password Manager only requires the web server to serve static documents (HTML, images) and to execute self-contained CGI executable programs. This means all non-essential web server content should be removed. This includes removing IISAdmin, Printers, Scripts and similar folders, as shown in the figure below:
The web server's scripting, indexing and data access subsystems should likewise be removed as shown in the figure below:
Remove RDS registry keys
As an extra precaution, remote data services (RDS) should be disabled by removing the following registry keys:
Remove ODBC drivers
All ODBC drivers that are not required should also be disabled because they can introduce possible security concerns for IIS. To disable the ODBC drivers, remove the data sources manually and add this entry to the registry:
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Jet\4.0\engines\SandBoxMode = 3
The above registry entry will ensure that no cmd.exe commands can be chained with ODBC queries.
Consult the Microsoft Knowledge Base for more information:
Restrict IUSR and IWAM account permissions
The IUSR account is created during the IIS installation and provides the mechanism that allows web clients to access the web server anonymously. The IWAM account is used to start out-of-process web applications in IIS. Do not add these accounts to a privileged group such as Administrators. Delete these accounts if possible as Password Manager does not use them.
Install the latest service packs, as these frequently include security patches and updates.
We recommend that to be notified of the latest Microsoft security upgrades, you subscribe to the Microsoft's security bulletin at:
Equally important to installing the latest service pack is testing the service pack installation before deployment on a production platform. This will ensure there are no adverse affects on Password Manager.
Password Manager sends and receives sensitive data over the network. Its communications include user passwords, administrator credentials and personal user information. These are all valuable assets that must be defended.
A basic defense against packet sniffers and similar attacks is to ensure that Password Manager can only be accessed over HTTPS.
Password Manager servers should be physically protected, since any logical security measures can be bypassed by an intruder with physical access to the server, time and skill.
Suggestions for physically securing the Password Manager server include:
- Location and access
Put the Password Manager server(s) in a locked and secured room. Restrict access to authorized personnel only. Access should be logged.
Protect the Password Manager server with uninterruptable power sources (UPS). UPS equipment will protect the server from temporary power loss that could cause a server crash or corruption of critical user files.
- Removable media
Restrict the boot process so it is more difficult for intruders to circumvent Windows 2000/2003 security by booting from floppy disks or a CD-ROM. Specifically, use a BIOS-level password, disable boot from a floppy drive or CD-ROM drive and lock the system BIOS to prevent unauthorized changes to the BIOS configuration.